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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ALLEGATIONS RAISED IN THE PETITION 
DO NOT, ON THEIR FACE, ESTABLISH THAT 
A CHANGE OF CUSTODY IS REQUIRED 
Crookston argues that because Hacking failed to respond in 
time to the default certificate, the allegations raised in his 
petition are assumed to be true and that the trial court properly 
adopted them as its findings of fact, and based on those findings, 
properly found it was in the best interest of the minor children to 
change their custody. Crookston cites Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 
593 (Utah App., 1992) as authority for his position. The court in 
Stevens also said that: 
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A trial court asked to render a judgment by default must 
first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an 
appellant's petition are, on their face, legally 
sufficient to establish a valid claim against the 
defaulting party. 
The allegations raised by Crookston in his petition are that 
Hacking moved several times with the children; that she did not 
always let Crookston know her whereabouts; that she developed poor 
housekeeping habits; that she did not kept the children clean; 
that she was receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children; and 
that she was living with a man to whom she was not married. In 
contrast, Crookston points out that he has remarried and has a 
house. (Record on Appeal, pp. 160-63.) It is submitted that these 
allegations, as those raised in Stevens, do not on their face, 
establish that there has been a material change in Hacking's 
ability to properly care for the children. In his detailed version 
of the facts, Crookston alleges that he has had problems since 1988 
with Hacking taking the children and not letting him know of their 
whereabouts. (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.) In September of 1990, 
Crookston stipulated to Hacking having custody, in spite of those 
allegations. (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.) It appears that Crookston 
was not concerned enough about Hacking's movements to say she was 
an unfit parent. 
Simply because Hacking may have moved on several occasions, 
and not kept Crookston fully informed of her whereabouts, does not 
necessarily mean that the children lacked proper care. Only a 
hearing going into the details would establish that fact. It would 
be necessary to determine why the moves took place, why notice may 
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not have always been given, and the affect of both on the children. 
Crookston points out in his brief that Hacking has alleged abuse of 
the children by him. (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.) Hacking has made 
the same allegation recently. (Record on Appeal, pp. 390-91, 377-
80, 384-85.) It would seem that the allegation needs to be 
considered in connection with Hacking's reasons for moving around. 
There may also be a question whether Crookston was always available 
to receive messages since there is no evidence of his whereabouts. 
Crookston acknowledges in his petition that Hacking was 
initially a good housekeeper, but he now claims that she has 
developed poor housekeeping habits. An initial question is what 
Crookston means in saying that Hacking is a poor housekeeper. It 
could mean very little as far as having any adverse affect upon the 
children. It does not necessarily follow that because one is a 
poor housekeeper, one is also a poor parent. Hacking suggests that 
many rich parents with immaculate houses have proven to be unfit 
parents. Hacking also wonders how Crookston has been in a position 
to judge Hacking's housekeeping abilities if he has not known her 
whereabouts. It is not as easy to keep a house spotless as 
children come or sickness sets in or other unforeseen events take 
place. More information would have to be gathered to determine the 
extent of the problem, its causes and its affect upon the children 
before saying that a change of custody is proper. The same can be 
said for the allegation that the children are not kept clean. One 
does not know what Crookston means by "clean." Perhaps it has been 
assumed that the children are not clean because on one occasion one 
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of them did not smell good. There is no information on the type of 
odor, its causes, or how often it was detected. A hearty game of 
football can cause one to smell. There may be a logical 
explanation for the bad odor, and it does not necessarily follow 
that the children are not otherwise receiving proper care. 
Crookston also appears to be saying that a change of custody 
is justified because at the time the petition was filed Hacking was 
receiving AFDC and living with a man to whom she was not married. 
Hacking believes that Crookston cannot seriously say that because 
one is receiving public assistance that person is a bad parent. It 
is common knowledge that there are millions of good parents in our 
society, who for one reason or another, have received public 
assistance. Nor can Crookston seriously say that because Hacking 
was living with a man out of wedlock she is a bad parent. The 
boyfriend may be an excellent source of support, stability, or 
guidance to the children. 
The upshot is that the allegations raised by Crookston in his 
petition justifying a change of custody are not sufficient on their 
face. 
Crookston also suggests that he is the more fit parent because 
he has remarried and has a house. Hacking does not see how those 
two facts lead to the conclusion that the children would be better 
off with him. One with the bigger or newer house is not 
necessarily the best parent. Nor can it be said that a remarriage 
is necessarily in the best interest of children. 
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POINT TWO 
HACKING HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Crookston appears to be arguing that Hacking is alleging, for 
the first time on appeal, that the lower court erred in not taking 
any evidence before changing custody and awarding child support and 
attorney fees to Crookston. After Crookston filed a default 
certificate, Hacking's prior counsel filed a motion to set aside 
the default judgment and an accompanying memorandum. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 181-84.) In that memorandum, Hacking stated: 
This case represents the future of small children and 
their interest's must be protected, we are not in receipt 
of any evaluations by qualified experts. Nor have any 
material allegations as to the childrens welfare be(en) 
raised other than they have been subject to several 
moves. I would ask the court to allow my clients the 
opportunity to respond to the complaint as they do have 
a legitimate defense to the allegations of the plaintiff. 
(Record on Appeal, p. 184.) 
When Hacking's present counsel entered the case, just prior to the 
hearing on Crookston's motion for default judgment, he filed a 
supplemental memorandum of points and authorities. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 234-38.) In that memorandum Hacking stated, in urging 
the court to set aside the default certificate: 
The Petition raises serious allegations. Plaintiff seeks 
to change the custody of three minor children from 
Defendant to Plaintiff. In considering those allegations 
the Court must put the children first. It must decide if 
there has been a substantial change in circumstances 
justifying a change of custody and also whether it 
would be in the best interest of the children to change 
custody. It is submitted that it is critical to the 
children that these issues be decided after a full 
hearing rather than on the basis of a default 
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certificate. (Record on Appeal, p. 237.) 
When the motion for default judgment was argued before the 
commissioner, Hacking's present counsel stated the same argument, 
though not very well. (Record on Appeal, pp. 336-37, 341.) 
Present counsel also made the same argument to the trial court 
judge by saying: 
Now, the effect of that order if you — if you let that 
order stand, what that means is that the defendant in 
this case is denied a trial. That means you're going to 
have a change of custody from one parent to another 
without any evidence being taken. And we're talking 
about children that aren't real, real young. They're not 
real old, but their ages are 13, 12 and eight. I also 
means you're awarding child support and attorney fees 
without — without a hearing. 
Now, the way I view this, Your Honor, is there — there 
are very few issues that come before the Court that are 
more important than child custody. And anytime the Court 
gets one of those sort of issues, that places a heavy 
burden on the Court. And my understanding is you — you 
really don't want to change custody from one parent to 
another, unless you can show that there's been a 
substantial change in circumstance, and that number two, 
it would be in the best interest of the children to make 
that change. (Record on Appeal, p. 352.) 
The issues of custody, child support and attorney fees go together. 
A child support award can only be determined after custody is 
decided. Attorney fees are likewise affected by who is awarded 
custody. All of these issues were clearly raised at the trial 
level, as illustrated above. 
POINT THREE 
HACKING CLEARLY POINTED OUT HOW 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
Crookston argues that Hacking has failed to point out how the 
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trial judge abused his discretion. Hacking believes she clearly 
stated that the trial judge abused his discretion in changing the 
custody of the minor children from Hacking to Crookston without 
holding an evidentiary hearing. Hacking's summary of argument 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-7.) and argument (Record on Appeal pp. 
7-10.) center on that point. 
Hacking's prior counsel sought to set aside the default 
certificate pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Record on Appeal, pp. 181-84.) While prior counsel concentrated 
on Rule 60(b)(1), both prior and present counsel also urged the 
court to set aside the default certificate in order to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine if it would be in the best 
interest of the minor children to have a change of custody. Rule 
60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly empowers the court 
to set aside a default judgment, ". . . for any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Hacking 
has continually argued that she should have been given relief from 
the default certificate and that the trial court erred in not 
granting it. 
POINT FOUR 
HACKING IS NOT BARRED FROM PROSECUTING 
HER APPEAL THOUGH SHE HAS BEEN HELD IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT 
Crookston argues that Hacking is barred from prosecuting her 
appeal because she has been held in contempt of court. This appeal 
is from the default judgment granted by the trial court on November 
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18, 1994. (Record on Appeal, pp 246-48.) Hacking was not in 
contempt when that order was executed and filed. Hacking was found 
in contempt on May 31, 1994 (Record on Appeal, pp. 402-5.) as a 
result of an order to show cause initially signed by the court on 
March 10, 1994. (Record on Appeal, pp. 316-17.) Hacking is not 
seeking relief from that order. The contempt stemmed from Hacking 
retaining custody of the children in Oregon after the default 
judgment was granted. (Record on Appeal, pp. 276-77.) Hacking 
believed it would be in the best interest of the children to remain 
in Oregon with her, and it was her hope that the trial court judge 
would overturn the order of the commissioner. (Record on Appeal, 
pp. 292-94.) It was a very emotional and difficult situation for 
her. Once the trial judge ruled against her, Hacking immediately 
filed a motion for stay of default judgment and order overruling 
and denying objection to recommendation of commissioner. (Record 
on Appeal, pp. 290-91.) Hacking was convinced the children should 
not be turned over to Crookston for the reasons set forth in the 
affidavits, (Record on Appeal, pp. 377-80, 384-85, 390-91.) and so 
sought to retain their custody until the appeal was over. The 
order of the trial judge was filed March 7, 1994. (Record on 
Appeal, pp. 262-64.) Hacking's motion for a stay was filed March 
21, 1994, (Record on Appeal, pp. 290-91.). The matter was set for 
hearing on April 6, 1994. (Record on Appeal, pp. 295-96.) Counsel 
for Crookston then asked that the April 6, 1994 hearing be 
continued, which it was. (Record on Appeal, pp. 303.-04.) Counsel 
for Hacking then attempted to obtain another hearing date, but 
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found that counsel for Crookston had an extremely heavy schedule. 
The first open date available to counsel for Crookston was May 31, 
1994. In order to accommodate counsel for Crookston, counsel for 
Hacking agreed to have Hacking appear on that date to answer to the 
order to show cause, rather than requiring Crookston to serve 
Hacking personally. By the time the matter came on for hearing, 
the children were with Crookston and the trial court judge ruled 
that the motion to stay the change of custody was moot. (Record on 
Appeal, p. 404.) For the above reasons, Hacking believes that she 
has the right to be heard on her appeal, in spite of the contempt 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted 
that the concerns raised by Crookston in his brief are without 
merit. The default judgment should be set aside and the trial 
court instructed to take evidence on whether there has been a 
substantial change in circumstance justifying a change of custody 
and whether it would be in the best interest of the children to 
make a change. The court should also determine what, if any, child 
support and attorney fees should^be awarded, 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of >cl<^ , 1994 
/, UTAH I4EGAL SERVICES/^ItfC. 
By: Stephen W. JuYien 
Attorneys for Defendant 
{/ 
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